Concentration of Power in Swiss E-ID

Switzerland’s federalist tradition delegates significant autonomy to its 26 cantons, allowing
them to tailor policies and services to local needs. The introduction of a nationwide
electronic identity (e-ID) system, however, represents a marked shift in digital governance:
by vesting authority over identity issuance and verification in the federal state, the new e-ID
law centralizes power and diminishes cantonal prerogatives. While a unified e-ID promises
interoperability and enhanced security, the concentration of competence at the
Confederation level undermines subsidiarity, stifles local innovation, and risks a democratic
deficit in a system historically grounded in cantonal and people’s self-determination.

Swiss Federalism and Cantonal Autonomy
Under Article 3 of the Swiss Constitution, all future powers belong to the cantons, unless the
Swiss people and the cantons decide, by constitutional amendment, that they shall be
attributed to the federation. This principle enshrines the subsidiarity norm: matters best
handled locally remain within cantonal competence, ensuring policies reflect regional
languages, legal traditions, and administrative capacities. In practice, cantons exercise
broad authority over education, healthcare, policing, and civil registers and identity
documents, areas where proximity to citizens fosters trust and responsiveness.

The E-ID Law and the Centralization of Digital Identity
On December 20, 2024, the Swiss Federal Assembly passed the Federal Act on Electronic
Identity Credentials and Other Electronic Credentials, establishing a state-recognised e-ID
to be rolled out by 2026. Unlike earlier, canton-driven pilots, the new scheme mandates that
all public authorities—confederation, cantons, and municipalities—accept the federal e-ID
alongside physical ID for electronic identification purposes. While private providers may
operate wallets, the Confederation retains exclusive authority over the trust framework,
credential schemas, and revocation registries. Consequently, cantonal solutions will be
superseded by a one-size-fits-all model dictated by federal technical and policy choices.

Erosion of Subsidiarity and Local Tailoring
By reallocating identity-management powers from cantons to the federal state, the e-ID law
breaches the subsidiarity ethos. Cantonal administrations lose autonomy over design and
implementation—functions they have long performed in tandem with local stakeholders.
This top-down approach risks producing a monolithic system that may not align with
linguistic and procedural variations across cantons. For instance, user interface elements or
data-disclosure workflows optimized for German-speaking urban centres may prove
cumbersome in rural, French- or Italian-speaking cantons.

Hindering Innovation and Experimentation
Cantons have historically acted as laboratories of democracy, piloting digital services—such
as e-voting, local health portals, and municipal e-administration platforms—before scaling
them nationally. Centralizing identity issuance under the Confederation risks stifling this
dynamic: any significant alteration or enhancement to the e-ID framework will require
federal approval, elongating development cycles and dampening the incentive for localized
experimentation. Moreover, private-sector innovators that previously partnered with
individual cantons face higher barriers: they must navigate federal procurement processes
and standardized certification regimes, reducing flexibility and increasing costs.

Complexity, Incoherence, and Privacy Concerns
Centralized identity provisioning introduces its own technical pitfalls. A major critique of a state-
run, single identity provider is that no central actor can serve all user groups
coherently—voluntary adoption means some citizens will decline the e-ID, necessitating parallel
systems and eroding transparency. Services catering to non-Swiss or partially registered
residents would require separate identity providers, creating confusion and administrative
overhead. Furthermore, having the Confederation mediate every authentication event
concentrates sensitive metadata—access logs, usage patterns, and verification requests—within
a single national database, heightening the risk of mass surveillance.

Furthermore, the notion of a single identity gateway also creates a tempting target for
adversaries: rather than spreading their efforts across thousands of sites and services, attackers
can focus on subverting one system to harvest credentials en masse. A breach of the central
provider—even a transient outage or misconfiguration—could effectively lock every user out of
their online accounts, from banking and healthcare to social media and e-government services.
Worse yet, such concentration makes it trivial to compile comprehensive activity logs, enabling
sophisticated profiling, unsolicited marketing, or politically motivated surveillance at a scale
previously impossible. Phishing campaigns would only need to mimic one login flow, increasing
their success rate and reducing the cognitive load on the victim. And because the e-ID would be
used ubiquitously, there’d be no “dark spaces” left for whistleblowers, dissidents, or vulnerable
populations to maintain anonymity when they really need it. In short, replacing the polycentric
patchwork of today’s digital identities with a single monolithic system risks undermining both
individual security and societal freedoms, trading fragmentation for fragility and opacity.

Democratic Accountability and the Referendum Safeguard
Switzerland’s direct-democracy mechanisms offer a check against unilateral centralization:
opponents of the e-ID law have gathered sufficient signatures to force a nationwide
referendum, likely scheduled for autumn 2025. Yet, in the interim, cantonal administrations
must adapt to the new federal framework, incurring integration costs and reengineering
existing digital processes. If the referendum overturns the law, this transitional burden will
represent wasted resources and damaged trust between the Confederation and cantons.

Conclusion
The e-ID law exemplifies the tension between the efficiencies of a centralized digital
infrastructure and the principles of Swiss federalism. While a unified identity system may
streamline cross-border and inter-cantonal digital services, the shift of power from cantons
to the Confederation compromises subsidiarity, curtails local innovation, and risks
democratic disconnect. As Switzerland navigates its referendum, policymakers should
consider hybrid approaches: granting cantons a participatory role in governance bodies,
enabling localized interface customization, and ensuring interoperability standards rather
than monolithic platforms. Such measures could preserve the dynamism of cantonal digital
experimentation while achieving the interoperability and security goals that underpin a
national e-ID.

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