By Berna Alp and Marianthe Stavridou INTRODUCTION As societies undergo rapid digital transformation, public infrastructure is being fundamentally rethought. Money is no exception. While cash is declining across much of the world the question is no longer whether money will become digital, but how. Digital money or digital money transfers are not merely a technical upgrade. It encodes political choices about privacy, power, accountability, and sovereignty. The architecture chosen today will shape how citizens interact with the state, how markets function, and how much autonomy individuals retain in everyday economic life. In Europe, the Digital Euro project represents one path forward: a centrally governed, account-based system operated through banks and payment service providers. In Switzerland, a different model is emerging—built on open-source software, privacy by design, and cryptographic guarantees rather than institutional promises. This alternative is embodied in GNU Taler, an operational digital payment system already in use. This article compares the two approaches across six criteria that consistently surface in public debates on digital infrastructure: privacy, security, inclusion and usability, transaction costs, tax compliance, and digital sovereignty. Using publicly available documentation from the European Central Bank and real-world deployments of GNU Taler, the comparison highlights a fundamental divergence in design philosophy. At its core, the contrast is simple. The Digital Euro relies on identification, intermediaries, and trust in centralized institutions. GNU Taler relies on data minimization, mathematical guarantees, and transparency through open code. One treats privacy as a policy choice that can be adjusted. The other makes privacy a technical property that cannot be revoked. As governments decide how digital money should work, Switzerland’s experience shows that alternatives to surveillance-based payment systems are not theoretical. They already exist—and they work. DIFFERENT REALITIES – A COMMON ISSUE  As cash usage declines across many societies-from Scandinavia to China-we face a fundamental question: What kind of digital infrastructure should replace it? Two competing paradigms are emerging, and the choices made today will shape the future of money, privacy, and democratic control over critical public systems. The European Central Bank, through its Digital Euro project, represents one approach: centralized control, proprietary systems, and comprehensive transaction surveillance.  Switzerland, through three distinct but interconnected initiatives, offers an alternative: open-source infrastructure, privacy-by-design, and digital sovereignty through transparency[1]. The contrast between the EU and Swiss approaches reflects fundamentally different assumptions about how to achieve security, stability, and public trust in digital infrastructure. These differences stem from two distinct perspectives: a closed socio-economic and political system with a top-down decision-making approach, which may lead to increased surveillance and authoritarianism; and a more complex, mixed system with a bottom-up approach which, when applied correctly, can result in an open, social, and stable system based on trust[2]. Despite the EU’s open-source policy[3], the European Central Bank (ECB) has disregarded it in the Digital Euro project creating also a rift between EU’s policy and ECB’s approach.  THE DIGITAL EURO’S CLOSED ARCHITECTURE – A MISSED OPPORTUNITY To understand why the Swiss model offers advantages, we first examine the Digital Euro payment system’s design. The European Central Bank presents the Digital Euro as inclusive, privacy-preserving, and sovereign. However, analysis against public-interest criteria reveals significant tensions between these stated goals and the proposed architecture. To evaluate the Digital Euro payment system, we use six criteria that consistently emerge as priorities in citizen surveys, Internet governance debates, and open digital infrastructure design: privacy; security; usability, inclusion & accessibility; freedom from transaction costs; tax collection & income transparency; and sovereignty through open source (FLOSS)[4]. For comparison, we examine GNU Taler, an open-source payment system that takes an alternative architectural approach. GNU Taler is currently operational in Switzerland through Taler Operations AG[5].  THE CORE PROBLEMS PRIVACY THROUGH PROMISES, NOT DESIGN The online Digital Euro relies on an account-based architecture[6] requiring full identification by banks and Payment Service Providers (PSPs). There is zero privacy from them – they know and monitor everything the user does as with credit cards today.  The ECB receives transaction data through the DESP (Digital Euro Service Platform), but claims to use pseudonymisation and encryption techniques to prevent direct linkage to individuals. However, PSPs have full visibility of user identities and transaction details, and the centralized architecture with unique DEAN (Digital Euro Account Number)[7]identifiers creates technical capability for re-identification through behavioral pattern analysis, even if policy promises claim otherwise.   This is fundamentally a trust model: users must believe intermediaries’ promises that they will not exploit or share the data (until they get hacked or e.g. being privatized). The offline variant of the digital euro offers cash-like anonymity while devices remain disconnected, but constrained by strict transaction limits designed to prevent money laundering and tax evasion and to mitigate the fact that such a solution cannot be secure and prevent two-sided anonymous spending that could be hidden from taxation.  THE OFFLINE SECURITY PARADOX Fully offline payment systems face an unsolvable mathematical problem: double-spending. Without real-time network connectivity to verify that a token hasn’t already been spent, a malicious actor could theoretically duplicate and spend the same digital token multiple times. While secure hardware elements can mitigate this risk, such protections have always been compromised historically. The ECB’s response to this inherent weakness, is very low transaction and holding limits, which simultaneously undermines the system’s usability and inclusion objectives. This creates a paradox: offline mode exists to provide cash-like privacy, but the security constraints required will make it too limited for everyday use. INCLUSION WITHOUT INNOVATION Despite its framing as an inclusion initiative, ECB documentation explicitly acknowledges that onboarding, authentication, and usage barriers will not differ materially from existing digital payment solutions.  Around 13.5 million people[8] in the euro area are non-bankable. As access to the Digital Euro will again be given through the existing banks and PSPs, any change to this number is highly unlikely.  Furthermore, the Digital Euro’s reliance on modern smartphones (Android or iPhone) creates additional exclusion barriers beyond the existing requirements for government-issued identification and KYC verification, many people lack access to compatible devices or the technical literacy needed to navigate authentication systems. THE SOVEREIGNTY BLIND SPOT Perhaps most striking is the absence of binding Free Libre Open-Source Software (FLOSS) requirements. Despite explicit EU-level policy commitments to open source in public digital infrastructure, ECB procurement documents do not mandate open-source licensing. This creates long-term vendor dependency, reduced public auditability, weakened democratic oversight and security opacity (vulnerabilities hidden in proprietary code).  For critical monetary infrastructure, arguably more important than any other government system, this represents a significant failure of digital sovereignty. And the fact that the Digital Euro will only work on Android mobiles and iPhones, both US corporate ecosystems, is another proof that sovereignty is far from being addressed in this project. To illustrate what would be possible with exiting FLOSS technology and to compare it to the payment solution design of the ECB for the Digital Euro, let us look at the GNU Taler design. GNU Taler was developed over the past decade and in 2021, the Swiss National Bank published Working Paper 2021-03, “How to Issue a Central Bank Digital Currency,” co-authored by cryptography pioneer David Chaum, GNU Taler founder Christian Grothoff, and SNB official Thomas Moser[9]. The paper proposes a token-based CBDC architecture based on the GNU Taler protocol. HOW GNU TALER WORKS GNU Taler implements a cash-like payment system with asymmetric privacy: cryptographically[10]guaranteed anonymity for payers combined with full transparency for recipients. At the level of technical architecture, a token-based (not Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) based) system using blind signature cryptography and mathematically guaranteed payer anonymity is in place. The system cannot link payments to spenders, even if forced to do so. Recipients remain fully identifiable, enabling income transparency for taxation. No user accounts, identity-based fraud, or tracking infrastructure are possible Key Innovation here is the security through data minimization, not data protection. What doesn’t exist cannot be stolen, leaked, or abused. COMPARISON: TALER VS. DIGITAL EURO PRIVACY The online Digital Euro is fully account-based and requires identification, giving banks and payment providers complete access to users’ transaction data and leaving privacy dependent on institutional promises that can fail through misuse or breaches. Its offline version offers anonymity but only for small amounts and relies on a mathematically fragile design that is inherently insecure. The offline anonymity may be wiped out once the wallet is reconnected tothe central system. In contrast, GNU Taler provides cryptographically enforced anonymity by never collecting payer data at all. Privacy is guaranteed by design, not policy. As a result, GNU Taler offers unconditional and durable privacy, while the Digital Euro offers either none online, or temporary, but mathematically insecure privacy offline.  SECURITY The online Digital Euro centralizes identity and transaction data, making it a prime target for cyberattacks and leaving risks like fraud and account takeover unchanged. Its offline version is vulnerable to double-spending and depends on historically fragile hardware security. GNU Taler avoids these threats entirely by eliminating user accounts and centralized databases, drastically reducing fraud risks to mainly device theft, which can be managed through available backups. Overall, the Digital Euro brings  nothing new online and introduces new weaknesses offline, while GNU Taler achieves security through data minimization. INCLUSION & USABILITY The online Digital Euro requires full identification, KYC compliance, and access to modern smartphones, effectively reproducing the same barriers that already exclude non-bankable and low-tech users, while its offline mode only allows very small payments and still depends on smartphone hardware, whereas GNU Taler enables digital payments with a single click authorization, offering cash-like simplicity that  even fits the needs of non-literate users, making it genuinely inclusive compared to the Digital Euro’s continued reliance on traditional account creation, identification and multi-factor authentication. TRANSACTION COSTS Although the Digital Euro is advertised as “free for basic use,” intermediaries still need compensation, meaning merchants will pay for infrastructure, compliance, and fraud, whereas GNU Taler is built around near-zero transaction fees, with its Free/Libre Open-Source Software (FLOSS) model removing licensing expenses and enabling economically viable micropayments down to fractions of a cent. So instead of merely shifting fees from Visa/Mastercard to European banks as in the case of the digital euro, GNU Taler delivers real structural cost reductions and significantly lowers fraud-related expenses to benefit all stakeholders. TAX COMPLIANCE For tax compliance, the online Digital Euro enables full transaction surveillance with complete visibility into user activity, while its offline mode allows untraceable cash-like payments limited to small amounts that neither fully prevent abuse nor resolve evasion risks, whereas GNU Taler structurally enforces transparency on merchants’ and recipients’ income without monitoring individual payers-ensuring taxes are collected where money is received rather than where it is spent-uniquely combining strong privacy with effective tax enforcement. SOVEREIGNTY The Digital Euro is likely to depend on proprietary systems, creating vendor lock-in and reliance on US-controlled devices and software ecosystems, and even if built by European firms, closed licensing prevents independent security audits, limits adaptability to evolving policy needs, and ties long-term operation to vendor survival and goodwill, whereas true digital sovereignty requires control over the code itself rather than the provider’s nationality, something GNU Taler achieves as fully Free/Libre Open-Source Software that is publicly auditable, vendor-independent, and deployable across platforms without reliance on specific technologies, delivering complete digital sovereignty. QUICK COMPARISON  CriterionDigital Euro (Online)Digital Euro (Offline)GNU TalerPrivacyAccount-based with full identificationStrong anonymity while offlineCryptographic payer anonymitySecuritySame as for credit cardsDouble-spending vulnerabilityNo ID fraud/Account take over, no data theft possible.UsabilitySimilar to current methods.Limited by transaction capsCash-like simplicityCostFree for basic use; intermediary fees remain and merchants always payAs for online version with high hidden costs (fraud, hardware)Near-zero fees by designTax TransparencyAll transaction details recordedCash-like untraceable transfersIncome transparency onlySovereigntyProprietary software dependencyProprietary hardware & software dependencyFully open source   CONCLUSION: ETHICS AS THE FOUNDATION OF DIGITAL MONEY At its core, the debate between the Digital Euro and GNU Taler is not merely technical or economic—it is fundamentally ethical. Digital payment systems shape power relations between citizens, institutions, and the state. When infrastructure is built around surveillance, centralized control, and proprietary technologies, it normalizes the erosion of privacy, weakens democratic oversight, and concentrates authority in the hands of a few intermediaries. Even when justified in the name of security or efficiency, such architectures risk transforming everyday economic activity into a source of continuous monitoring. The Swiss approach embodied by GNU Taler demonstrates that ethical design is not only possible but practical. By minimizing data collection, enforcing privacy through cryptography rather than policy promises, ensuring transparency where it matters for taxation and law enforcement, and relying on open-source principles, it aligns technological innovation with core democratic values: autonomy, accountability, inclusion, and sovereignty. Instead of asking citizens to trust institutions with vast amounts of sensitive data, it removes the need for such trust altogether through structural safeguards. Ethically responsible digital money should protect individuals by default, not conditionally. It should empower societies through openness, not lock them into opaque systems of control. As governments across Europe and beyond redesign monetary infrastructure for the digital age, the choice is ultimately between systems that can expand surveillance and dependency, and systems that preserve freedom, dignity, and public trust. The lesson from Switzerland is clear: ethical digital infrastructure is not an obstacle to progress, but it is the very foundation of a resilient, inclusive, and democratic financial future. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] It should be clear that ethics-by-design, privacy-by-design, transparency-by-design, and similar approaches demonstrate that a wide range of values can be taken into consideration during system development. However, they do not guarantee that these values will ultimately be realized. Incorporating such considerations into the design process nonetheless increases the possibility that these values will be embedded in the final system. (Brey, P., Dainow, B. Ethics by design for artificial intelligence. AI Ethics 4, 1265–1277 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-023-00330-4) [2] This distinction draws on debates about governance models in digital infrastructure, particularly contrasting centralized, top-down systems that prioritize control and standardization with decentralized, bottom-up approaches that emphasize transparency, participation, and trust. (Leese, Matthias. (2026). Benchmarking and Provenance: The Politics of Data Trust in EU Internal Security. International Political Sociology 20 (1): olaf042. https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olaf042 [3] https://commission.europa.eu/about/departments-and-executive-agencies/digital-services/open-source-software-strategy_en [4] The analysis draws primarily on the ECB’s own documentation, publicly available information on the internet and the assessment framework developed in “Decoding the Digital Euro”, a book by Leon V. Schumacher. (2023). Decoding the Digital Euro: Friend or Foe? ISBN: 978-3-9525996-0-0.  [5]https://www.taler.net/en/news/2025-01.html [6]https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/digital_euro/timeline/profuse/shared/pdf/ecb.degov240325_digital_euro_multiple_accounts.en.pdf [7] https://www.ecb.europa.eu/euro/digital_euro/timeline/profuse/shared/pdf/ecb.dedocs220420.en.pdf [8] https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/articles/2022/html/ecb.ebart202205_02~74b1fc0841.en.html [9] https://www.snb.ch/en/publications/research/working-papers/2021/working_paper_2021_03 [10] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blind_signature The post Open Source vs. Closed Control: How Switzerland Built Better appeared first on ISOC Switzerland Chapter.

Swiss lawmakers have taken a significant step in protecting privacy rights while maintaining security oversight. The parliamentary Transport and Telecommunications Commission (KVF-S) unanimously supported the Feller Motion, which emphasizes balancing surveillance with fundamental rights, economic competitiveness, and job creation. Following feedback from stakeholders, including ISOC Switzerland Chapter, during the consultation process, the Federal Council agreed to revise and re-consult on proposed changes to surveillance ordinances. Importantly, the Federal Council confirmed that encryption removal obligations do not apply to end-to-end encryption used by messaging services. This development supports Switzerland’s position as a leading jurisdiction for privacy-focused technology companies and reinforces the country’s commitment to protecting fundamental rights while addressing legitimate security concerns. The Internet Society (ISOC) Switzerland Chapter is a non-profit organization that engages on a variety of Internet-related topics, ensuring that it is a place of possibility, opportunity, and progress that benefits people worldwide. We provide technically-grounded advice, policy recommendations, and educational material regarding privacy, security, Free and Open-Source Software, and digital sovereignty. We also organize informative events and debates like the annual Public Policy Sessions and participate in collaborative research projects like the NGI0 Commons Fund. As a national chapter of the international organization responsible for the .org domain, ISOC CH acts as a gateway between Switzerland and the international digital civil society. You can consider becoming a member (through the main ISOC web site) following the instructions at https://isoc.ch/membership, or just subscribe to our newsletter (2-3 announcements per year) by sending a message to contact@isoc.ch The post Positive Development in Swiss Surveillance (VÜPF and VD-ÜPF) Framework Debate appeared first on ISOC Switzerland Chapter.

Giovedì 12 febbraio, dalle 19:00 alle 21:30, nell’ambito dell’iniziativa 100x100gaza , per rispondere collettivamente alla catastrofe provocata dal genocidio, Rotta Genuina e Vivèro ospitano una serata di approfondimento su cybersicurezza, controllo digitale e tecnologie conviviali. Le tecnologie digitali non sono mai neutre: tracciano, profilano, monitorano e spesso replicano disuguaglianze che esistono offline. Sono strumenti di dominio con impatti sociali e politici molto concreti. Partendo dal “Laboratorio Palestina”, dove le tecnologie digitali vengono sperimentate come strumenti di controllo, sorveglianza e guerra, allargheremo lo sguardo alla dimensione geopolitica globale, fino ad arrivare all’Italia, per capire come le tecnologie controllano e attraversano i nostri territori. Proveremo a immaginare modelli tecnologici e pratiche alternative a quelli grandi piattaforme, costruendo insieme una nuova “cassetta degli strumenti”. Se ne parlerà insieme a Dario Guarascio - docente di economia a La Sapienza, autore del libro Imperialismo Digitale, Laterza Graffio - del gruppo di ricerca C.I.R.C.E. GazaWeb – Gli alberi della rete Si discuterà d: 🔹 come i dispositivi digitali possono essere usati per controllare, sorvegliare e normalizzare forme di violenza 🔹 il “Laboratorio Palestina”: sperimentazione di strumenti digitali di controllo 🔹 il ruolo delle Big Tech e dei finanziamenti europei nel mantenimento di questi sistemi 🔹 pratiche di boicottaggio e alternative tecnologiche conviviali 🔹 strumenti concreti di consapevolezza digitale 🔹 come sostenere progetti di tecnologie solidali e di lotta In più: Aperitivo, banchetti di GazaWeb e Women for Gaza + raccolta fondi per la settimana 100x100 Gaza. Presso Vivero –via Antonio Raimondi 37, Roma | 12 febbraio | 19:00–21:30 A seguire concerto benefit da Zazie nel Metro.

The European Commission has been asking for feedback from the 6th of January to the 3rd of February to shape its “European Open Digital Ecosystem Strategy”. In our submission we stress that it is important to understand that Free and Open-Source Software (FOSS) * is the backbone of our digital infrastructure; * is a global and collaborative phenomenon and that isolating it along geographic boundaries is counterproductive; * has to be understood as a symbiotic ecosystem of diverse players (businesses, public administrations, foundations, academic institutions, and individual contributors) rather than “just” an economic sector/industry; * has a variety of strategic and practical benefits over proprietary software solutions and should therefore be adopted widely by European institutions. If you’re interested in the topic, we can also recommend you to read the submissions of the Free Software Foundation Europe and the OSI Europe Foundation. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Internet Society (ISOC) Switzerland Chapter is a non-profit organization that engages on a variety of Internet-related topics, ensuring that it is a place of possibility, opportunity, and progress that benefits people worldwide. We provide technically-grounded advice, policy recommendations, and educational material regarding privacy, security, Free and Open-Source Software, and digital sovereignty. We also organize informative events and debates like the annual Public Policy Sessions and participate in collaborative research projects like the NGI0 Commons Fund. As a national chapter of the international organization responsible for the .org domain, ISOC CH acts as a gateway between Switzerland and the international digital civil society. You can consider becoming a member (through the main ISOC web site) following the instructions at https://isoc.ch/membership, or just subscribe to our newsletter (2-3 announcements per year) by sending a message to contact@isoc.ch. The post Our submission to the EU Call for Evidence on the “European Open Digital Ecosystem Strategy” appeared first on ISOC Switzerland Chapter.

Are you interested in shaping the future of the Internet in Europe? This is a great opportunity for young people in our community to engage directly in European digital policy discussions. The European Dialogue on Internet Governance (EuroDIG) is the European regional event of the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Each year, it brings together 600–900 stakeholders from across Europe, both on site and online, to discuss key issues related to the future of the Internet. The messages emerging from these discussions are published and presented to the European Commission, the Council of Europe, the UN Internet Governance Forum, and other relevant institutions. EURODIG 2026: KEY DETAILS * Dates: 26–27 May 2026 * Location: Charlemagne Building, European Commission, Brussels * Host: EURid, the registry for the .eu domain name * Special milestone: Celebrating 20 years of .eu, marking two decades of trusted digital identity in Europe YOUTHDIG 2026: FULLY FUNDED YOUTH PARTICIPATION The Youth Dialogue on Internet Governance (YOUthDIG) is a programme designed to empower young people aged 18–30 to actively participate in EuroDIG. YOUthDIG: * Fully funds participants’ travel to YOUthDIG and EuroDIG * Introduces participants to European digital policies and current Internet governance issues * Provides capacity-building training to enable meaningful participation in EuroDIG sessions * Includes intercultural activities and a strong peer-learning environment * Supports young people in contributing their perspectives to policy discussions The programme begins with four online webinars, followed by a three-day in-person pre-programme, and then continues directly into EuroDIG. * YOUthDIG dates: 22–25 May 2026 * EuroDIG dates: 26–27 May 2026 APPLY NOW The call for applications for YOUthDIG 2026 is now open. We strongly encourage members of our community to apply and to share this opportunity with others who may be interested in contributing to discussions on the future of the Internet. More information and the application details are available here: https://www.eurodig.org/get-involved/youthdig/#tab-call-for-application-26 Thank you for supporting and empowering the next generation of digital leaders. The post Call for Applications: YOUthDIG 2026 & EuroDIG in Brussels appeared first on ISOC Switzerland Chapter.

On the 18th of November 2025 two conferences in two European capitals simultaneously discussed issues pertaining to the buzzword of digital sovereignty: the DINAcon in Bern, Switzerland and the European Digital Sovereignty Summit in Berlin, Germany. Despite addressing similar topics, the conferences could not have been more different in content, however: While Swiss administrators used the DINAcon to present their implementation efforts with respect to the free and open-source software and interoperability requirements outlined in articles 9 and 14 of the EMBAG law, respectively, the European governments represented in the European Council pitched a very different vision of digital sovereignty in Berlin: One which emphasizes the competitiveness of and investment into proprietary European software solutions, most likely at the expense of consumer protections. We, as the Switzerland Chapter of the Internet Society (ISOC-CH), are very concerned about the commercial re-interpretation of the term digital sovereignty. While supporting local businesses to develop and administer digital solutions is an essential part of the equation to achieve digital sovereignty, it must not come at the cost of jeopardizing the ability of states to act independently now and in the future. The reaction to an outsized dependency on (state-sponsored) American and Chinese Big Tech firms cannot possibly be an outsized dependency on (state-sponsored) European or Swiss Big Tech companies. Apart from ignoring the fact that companies can change domiciles, be bought by foreign investors or go bankrupt, the “buy European” approach also showcases a lack of creativity and imaginative power on the part of European politicians who cannot fathom an alternative to emulating other global powers and reveals a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of technological dependencies: The fact that a software vendor or cloud computing provider is domestic does nothing to reduce the vendor lock-in effects, the restrictiveness of proprietary software licenses, and the resulting stifling of competition and innovation. Simply procuring digital services domestically falls massively short of achieving digital sovereignty as defined by either the Swiss (with a narrow focus on the state) or European (with a wider perspective including non-state actors) regulators: > “Digital sovereignty requires the necessary control over and ability to act in > the digital realm to ensure the delivery of state services.” – own translation > of the Swiss government’s definition of digital sovereignty > “Digital sovereignty is the ability of Member States to be able to regulate > their digital infrastructure, data and technologies. It encompasses the > ability of individuals, businesses and institutions in Europe to act > independently in the digital world, allowing for autonomous decisions about > the use, governance, and development of digital systems without undue reliance > on external actors […].” – taken from the Declaration for European Digital > Sovereignty A more encompassing answer as to how ensure digital sovereignty is needed. Any entity which wants to have control over the digital services it uses and aims to be able to change them to serve its specific needs should strive to operationalize the following principles: * local infrastructure: Having access to geographically local computing resources, network infrastructure, and electricity is a prerequisite for being able to exert control over one’s digital services. * local expertise: Without a motivated, experienced and educated local work force who can develop, debug and deploy digital services one cannot truly operate in a self-sovereign manner. * interoperability: Open standards and open data formats allow for connectivity between services and reduced switching costs, thereby preventing vendor lock-ins and increasing one’s agency. * free and open-source software: The four freedoms of free and open-source software (use, change, share and improve) give a legal and technical guarantee to the user to be a self-determined actor rather than a disenfranchised consumer. Instead of paying lip service to free and open-source software like the European Declaration for Digital Sovereignty does by making it optional and conditional, > “Open-source solutions can play an important role enhancing digital > sovereignty, > provided they meet high cybersecurity standards and are complemented by > reliable proprietary technologies where appropriate.” policy makers should recognize that actual digital sovereignty cannot be achieved without a firm commitment to free and open-source software. Operationalizing these criteria is obviously harder than simply procuring domestic digital products. It requires new capabilities, organizational structures and cultural changes. But unlike the simplistic “buy domestic” strategy – whose political appeal in times of economic and geopolitical turmoil is obvious – they actually provide a path to achieve what the Declaration for European Digital Sovereignty sets out as a goal: ensuring “the ability of individuals, businesses and institutions in Europe to act independently in the digital world”. As an NGI-0 consortium member, ISOC-CH will continue highlighting the advantages of free and open-source software, open standards, and open data formats for attaining digital sovereignty to policy makers, administrators, educators, and the wider public. We are happy to support Swiss decision makers on municipal, cantonal and federal levels with our expertise and network to take steps towards true digital sovereignty together. The post The state of discussions on digital sovereignty in Switzerland and Europe appeared first on ISOC Switzerland Chapter.

Il 4-5-6 febbraio partecipiamo alla quarta edizione del festival sulle arti inclusive #InclusiveArts2026 che investiga le pratiche di #MachineLearning nel campo dell’inclusive design e dell’accessibilità delle piattaforme digitali. In occasione dell'evento iNCLUSIVE aRTS 2026 organizzato dal Prof. Enrico Bisenzi presso l'Accademia di Belle Arti di Roma, siamo state invitate a partecipare in modo trasversale nelle tre giornate per contribuire con uno sguardo critico ad analizzare l'impatto dell'Intelligenza Artificiale nel campo dell'Inclusive Design. Inoltre, nella prima giornata, condurremo un laboratorio di S/gamificazione dal titolo Automazione industriale VS Intelligenza Artigianale in collaborazione con Betterpress Lab AUTOMAZIONE INDUSTRIALE VS INTELLIGENZA ARTIGIANALE: “GIOCARE O ESSERE GIOCATE” (A CURA DI AGNESE TROCCHI E BETTERPRESS LAB) Analisi d’interfaccia: un percorso a ritroso dal digitale all’analogico Ogni giorno nelle nostre attività personali, di studio o di lavoro, siamo costantemente esposte a piattaforme digitali che influenzano il nostro modo di comunicare e di vivere le relazioni. Attraverso l’analisi emotiva d’interfaccia comprendiamo i meccanismi che influenzano il modo in cui viviamo le interazioni digitali, in particolare con i chatbot conversazionali. Senza accorgercene automatizziamo i nostri comportamenti per interagire con le intelligenze artificiali su cui proiettiamo caratteristiche umane. Esplorando la “zona della macchina” in cui siamo quotidianamente immerse, realizzeremo due tipi di intervento: la mattina analizzeremo le interfacce digitali di videogiochi, social media, app di messaggistica e chatbot per comprendere cosa è la gamificazione utilizzando il metodo della Pedagogia Hacker; il pomeriggio ricostruiremo in modo analogico le interfacce che più sono presenti nelle nostre vite utilizzando gli strumenti della stampa a caratteri mobili. MATTINA: LABORATORIO PRATICO/TEORICO “GIOCARE O ESSERE GIOCATE” Ogni giorno siamo chiamate a partecipare e a contribuire instancabilmente alle “comunità” digitali, costruite seguendo tecniche di gamificazione. Veniamo spronate a interagire con chatbot conversazionali pronti a rispondere a ogni nostra domanda. Ogni esperienza di interazione si trasforma in una complicata gara, con un sacco di punti e classifiche, livelli e campioni. Conosciamo per esperienza diretta le regole di questi “giochi”: se ci comportiamo bene, otteniamo molti “like”, strike, notifiche, cioè caramelle sintetiche per i nostri cervelli (sotto forma di dopamina); se siamo scarse rimaniamo a bocca asciutta. Analizzeremo testi di chatbot e testi digitali di esseri umani. Osserveremo gli spazi e gli strumenti di cui si avvalgono e, nel corso di un viaggio a ritroso tra gli strati e nel tempo, arriveremo ad esplorare come il mezzo modifica il messaggio e compromette i fini. POMERIGGIO: LABORATORIO PRATICO/CREATIVO “Stampa a caratteri mobili – pensare con le mani” Siamo in un mondo dove le piattaforme social, le app di messaggistica e le conversazioni con i chatbot ci travolgono in un flusso incessante di emozioni e informazioni. Con curiosità hacker solleveremo gli strati delle tecnologie per osservare cosa cambia se a scrivere è una IA, un essere umano su un supporto digitale o su carta con un torchio tipografico. Come cambiano la composizione e l’impatto emotivo della comunicazione al cambiare dei supporti tecnologici che utilizziamo? Comporremo con caratteri mobili e stamperemo con tirabozze tipografici, inchiostrando la forma manualmente con i rulli. Utilizzeremo questi strumenti per ricostruire un’interfaccia digitale con la tecnologia analogica. Attraverso l’osservazione dei nostri comportamenti sperimenteremo un percorso catartico che ci permetterà di acquisire una maggiore consapevolezza dei processi nascosti nei rituali digitali quotidiani e di costruire ricette utili a colmare l’alienazione dalle tecnologie che fanno parte delle nostre vite. SEDE DELL’EVENTO Come per le altre edizioni il ‘festival’ #InclusiveArts si terrà presso la sede di Campo Boario dell’Accademia di Belle Arti di Roma – Largo Dino Frisullo, s.n.c., Testaccio, 00153 Roma https://maps.app.goo.gl/KCVhAaR8rTsy4kEQ6 ( 41.873922, 12.472511 ). Iscrizioni per ottenimento credito Per saperne di più sul programma e sulle modalità d'iscrizione visitate il sito del Prof. Enrico Bisenzi

On Friday 18 September a small group of people gathered at L200 (and online) to analyze certain important risks associated with the new law on the Swiss E-ID. The discussion was very lively and productive and the main outcomes relevant for keeping a critical attitude with the fast digital transformation that is happening everywhere. We identified 3 major “risk areas” that need to be better understood especially now that the outcome of the referendum was positive, and the Swiss E-ID will be eventually implemented: 1) Unnecessary dependence on technology in everyday life. 2) Extended exposure of one’s private data. 3) Increased potential damage by identity theft, device hacking or failure. Some of these risks could be better addressed by the current law, most notably the lack of clear measures that ensure its optional character. And others, like the increased exposure to surveillance and various forms of attacks or accidents, are questioning the necessity of a Swiss E-ID in the first place.  The main goal of our discussion was not to repeat the main arguments that prioritize those risks in comparison to the respective benefits mostly related to convenience and law enforcement. The goal was to discuss the most effective ways of communicating those risks to raise the awareness and engagement levels toward a wise digital transformation. 1) The optional character of the Swiss E-ID is an empty promise This is a key point to communicate properly: A digital E-ID stops to be “optional” when it is obligatory for an activity that is really important for someone. If the E-ID is required for me to have an operation for a serious disease it stops being optional for me. It is obligatory. And if for people that have an ID, the compromise to have also an E-ID to access vital services might not seem such a disaster, it becomes one for those without an ID in the first place. If you are not one of those that believe that such people should be exterminated, you should make sure that the E-ID stays truly optional. The law does not guarantee this, but the people can still fight for it. Related to this topic, you can read a recent publication by the Computer magazine titled “How much technology is needed to build a smart community space?“, by Panayotis Antoniadis, which explains why it is important to maintain a wide set of more or less technological options for addressing social problems and why FLOSS software is a key ingredient for enabling local communities to make the right choices. 2) Stronger identity means more powerful surveillance Simple narratives around surveillance capitalism like the “age verification with restricted data” case study, as promoted of the “pro” campaign for the Swiss E-ID, can be dangerous. The threats to privacy caused by the avalanche of digitization cannot be addressed only through protection measures. It is a complex issue that requires complex thinking, not an easy task for communication specialists.  The intention of the Swiss E-ID law has a positive dimension. It aims to minimize the amount of personal data shared with private companies when they need to verify certain aspects of our identity, most notably our age. This is a good design, but it underestimates the power of big corporations to extract more than necessary information in the same way that nudge people into accepting their cookies.  Moreover, it adds one more actor that has full access of one’s digital life, the government. Big companies still collect the same amount of personal data they did before and in addition have access also to our official identification information. And the government that was not aware of our online activities, it will now has also access to a significant part of it. Of course, we trust more our government than Facebook. This is clear. But even a benign state can fail sometimes, can become the victim of attacks, or change in light of a big crisis. Finally, even if we do our best to protect our privacy online, this success can cause important side-effects. A more trustworthy digital world can increase our addiction and dependence on digital services and the power of those having access to this information for producing knowledge on human behavior. 3) Increased digitization increases vulnerability to attacks or failures Accidents or failures happen always, with the examples of blackout in Spain and the airport ransomware still present in our memory, we can only hope that we will not be among the victims of the next natural disaster, malicious attack, or internal failure.  Moreover, the danger of identity theft is another reason why the optional character is highly compromised. Here, the Swiss E-ID law cannot do much. It is a matter of implementation and the advantage is always to those that wait in the back instead of leading the process. The fact that the proposed solution is not fully open source can only make us worry. The more we depend on digital devices for our everyday life the more vulnerable we depend on potential failures and accidents. If we get used to our Swiss E-ID and we leave its physical counterpart always at home, the more harmful it will become if we fall from the bicycle and break our phone or if we lose it before going to an important event or trip that requires it. Final note: the critical role of Free/Libre and Open Source Software The result of the referendum was remarkably close despite the fact that the majority of political parties were in favor. This means that the Swiss people are really concerned by the risks of digitization and thus it is really important to discuss and debate about specific details of its implementation. For this, the role of Free/Libre and Open Source Software is critical, and ISOC-CH is a communication partner of the more ambitious funding programmes for supporting FLOSS software worldwide, the NGI0 Commons Fund. Our forthcoming “what does digital sovereignty mean for … ” series, will include this key dimension in the overall debate taking the perspective of different actors and focusing on what can be actually done, now. Just waiting the European industry to fight the American Big Tech on its own field is not very productive. There is a lot we can all do to protect ourselves from actors that abuse their power and from technologies that do not serve our real needs.  Become an ISOC-CH member and/or join our announcements list by sending a message to contact@isoc.ch to stay tuned! The post What could possibly go wrong with the Swiss E-ID? (a short summary) appeared first on ISOC Switzerland Chapter.

Sono aperte le iscrizioni all'edizione 2026 del Master Studi e Politiche di Genere dell'Università di Roma Tre. Quest'anno il Master prevede due percorsi: uno esclusivamente in presenza e uno esclusivamente online su strumenti liberi. La domanda di ammissione va inviata entro il 7 gennaio 2026. È possibile anche partecipare come uditrici a uno o più moduli. Nato nel 2001 all’Università Roma Tre, il Master Studi e Politiche di Genere è lo spazio dove trovare strumenti teorici per l’introduzione e l’aggiornamento sulle tendenze e i dibattiti più recenti, sostanziati da un approccio genealogico, che restituisce la ricchezza dei percorsi precedenti, intrapresi da singole, gruppi e movimenti. Agnese Trocchi e Lavinia Marziale curano il modulo Tecnologia Critica e da quest'anno si occupano anche degli spazi digitali per il percorso online. Il master in Studi e Politiche di Genere a distanza per il suo svolgimento ha adottato Nextcloud e Discourse, software liberi e open-source per archiviazione cloud, discussioni e condivisione di spazi e materiali digitali, e molto altro. Siamo partite dall’osservare tanto gli strumenti digitali che accompagnano le nostre attività di studio, svago o lavoro, quanto le nostre relazioni con questi strumenti. Comprendere il funzionamento di reti, hardware e interfacce digitali, la loro progettazione e le interazioni di potere geopolitico che le rendono possibili, ci dà la possibilità di situarci nel mondo digitale e fare delle scelte consapevoli. Le tecnologie digitali non sono infatti né neutre né eteree, ma incarnano e modellano a loro volta le nostre relazioni e comunicazioni. Per questo le nostre istanze di Nextcloud e Discourse sono ospitate sui server gestiti da Maadix, società catalana che offre servizi informatici promuovendo i valori della privacy delle comunicazioni, sicurezza digitale e libertà di informazione. Tutto il programma del percorso online è consultabile qui Il programma del percorso in presenza è qui Per informazioni sulle modalità di iscrizione invece seguire questo link.